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The idea of promoting large-scale agricultural investment in order to 
achieve rural development in Africa has been strongly promoted by 
governments, bilateral and global development agencies since the early 
2000’s. However, it is becoming widely recognized that many of these 
investments never materialize. So far, few studies have tried to understand 
this trend of failure. The main aim of my doctoral research was to 
contribute to the knowledge about how and why this new wave of large-
scale agricultural investment so far has failed to deliver proposed outcomes, 
through studying a Swedish sugar-cane investment in Tanzania. One of the 
most important findings was that stalled or failed projects can have quite 
serious negative impacts on people living in poverty, not least pastoralists 
and smallholder farmers living on or using the land leased by the investor. 
This brief will outline how it is possible that something that never 
happened can have severe impacts. It makes the point that delayed or failed 
investments need much more attention in development policy. Finally, it 
will provide some policy messages on how development practitioners can 
work to avoid that such “non-materialized” investment projects harm 






On 28 July 2009, a Swedish company called SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania 
sent a 2.5-page application letter to the Swedish Development Cooperation 
Agency Sida. SEKAB’s overall idea was to develop sugar cane plantations of 
several hundred thousand hectares of land in two districts in Tanzania: 
Bagamoyo and Rufiji. The main aim was to produce ethanol for the 
European market. The application letter emphasized the company’s high 
ambitions for social and environmental sustainability. For instance, the 
company refers to climate change and peak oil, the opportunity to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions with ethanol as fuel, byproducts such as electricity 
for the Tanzanian market, and sustainable rural development. The time line 
presented was to have the project up and running in 2010. 
 
It was at this point in time that Sida assigned the Sida Helpdesk for 
Environment and Climate Change, based at the Swedish University for 
Agricultural Sciences1, to provide comments on the sustainability of the 
project. I was employed at the Helpdesk, and became part of performing 
that assignment, for three reasons: I had been following the debate on large-
scale biofuel production in Africa as a solution to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions the past few years, including SEKAB’s plans and associated 
reports and initiatives that had taken place in Sweden and Tanzania, I had 
some experience of Tanzania, and I had previously been living in rural 
Indonesia, working with issues related to large-scale oil palm plantations. 
In my assessment, I found controversial changes in the Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment of the Bagamoyo project, systematically 
downplaying potential negative impacts of the project on environment and 
                                                            
1 The Sida Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change is an advisory group that 
assists Sida to integrate environment and climate change perspectives into Swedish 
development projects and programs. The group at SLU was later merged with a 
group at Gothenburg University with a similar assignment, in order to form one 
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people. This was only the first controversy the project was to become 
involved in. 
 
I didn't know it then, but this particular sugar-cane project, the high 
expectations behind it and its practical implementation on the ground, was 
to become the main focus of my PhD thesis, which I began writing three 
years later, in 2012. I was to spend seven months in Tanzania, interviewing 
District government representatives, state officials in prominent positions, 
representatives of Sida and the African Development Bank, state officials at 
Tanzanian ministries and authorities with responsibilities on land and 
agriculture. Not least, I would spend months living with, talking to and 
trying to understand the perspectives and needs among rural residents 
impacted by large-scale agro-investment. In the end, when President 
Magufuli revoked the company’s land rights in 2016, I had followed the 
project over nearly a decade.  
 
The project enjoyed strong support. It was referred to as an “iconic project” 
by the Tanzanian government, and as “state-of-the-art” by Sida, with a 
vision to become a “role model” for agro-energy production in Tanzania. 
The African Development Bank and other Development Banks were ready 
to finance the project, if certain criteria were met. Not least, the President 
at the time, Kikwete, was pushing for the project in various ways. Sida 
decided in 2014 to fund the project through a grant to be used as a security 
for a South African bank loan for a bridging phase to a larger loan. Despite 
this perhaps unprecedented support, the project never materialized. In my 
doctoral thesis, I tried to understand why. What happened? 
 
I wanted to write this dissertation brief in the hope of spreading my findings 
to a wider audience. I hope to be able to convert a critical study of 
development cooperation into something more constructive and tangible 
for those who work with, or have an interest in, development cooperation, 
and offer some ideas about what could be done in order to increase its 





The brief is based on my doctoral thesis ”Development Delayed: Exploring 
the failure of a large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania to deliver promised 
outcomes” which I defended 21 September 2018 at the Swedish University 
for Agricultural Sciences. It contained three, peer-reviewed papers and one 
manuscript, and a cover essay of 160 pages. The full dissertation gives much 
more detailed descriptions and references for those interested.  
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Since the early 2000s, the agenda to promote large-scale agricultural 
investment in order to achieve rural development in Africa has been 
strongly promoted by the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, 
African and European Governments, and supported by several bilateral 
development agencies including USAID, The British Department for 
International Development and the Swedish Development Agency Sida. 
The idea is that African governments will lease or sell land to mainly foreign 
investors, in order to bring about modern and efficient agricultural 
production, increased food security and poverty reduction. An important 
underlying assumption is that smallholder agricultural production is 
outdated and inefficient. In the beginning, the emphasis was largely on 
production of biofuel crops such as jatropha or palm oil for biodiesel, and 
sugar or maize for ethanol. Eventually, however, the critical public debate 
on “food versus fuel”, and other factors, led to a shift towards food crop 
production. During this time, several bilateral donors, including Sida, 
decided to explore the possibilities of collaborating with investors, with the 
stated aim to ensure that people in poverty would benefit as much as 
possible from such land-based investments.  
 
However, it is becoming widely recognized within the large community of 
researchers studying large-scale agricultural investments in Africa, that 
many of these investments never materialize. Some projects never leave the 
stage of being a paper product, other projects start crop production but go 
bankrupt. Others struggle for years to start production, are repeatedly 
delayed, but fail in the end. Even though the trend of delayed or failed 
large-scale agro-investments is becoming well-known, so far few studies 
have tried to understand this trend of failure. Therefore, the main aim of 





why this new wave of large-scale agricultural investment so far has failed to 
deliver proposed outcomes.  
 
One of the most important findings from my research was that these failed 
projects can have quite serious negative impacts on rural people living in 
poverty, not least pastoralists and smallholder farmers living on or using 
the land leased by the investor. In this policy brief, I will show how it is 
possible that something that never happened can have severe impacts. I 
want to make the point that these delayed or failed investments need much 
more attention in development policy: The impression that “nothing 
happens” can be very misleading. I will point to several ways through which 
policy makers within development bodies can work to ensure that such 
“non-materialized” investment projects do not harm people living in 
poverty. To understand more about the challenges with large-scale 
agricultural investment is particularly important since the agenda of large-
scale agricultural investment is still supported by international 
development cooperation today. Moreover, these policy messages might 
apply not only to large-scale agro-investments, but also to other large, 
complex development projects. The findings of this thesis are relevant also 
because they can present experiences from collaboration between 
development agencies and the private sector, another agenda that is still 
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Against this background, the aim of my thesis was to contribute to the 
knowledge about how and why the new wave of large-scale agro-investment 
fails to achieve expected outcomes. To explore this, I studied two 
investments in Tanzania that had secured land access for starting large-scale 
food production (sugar cane and oil palm), but seemed to be struggling to 
start production. However, in my thesis, and thus in this policy brief, I 
mainly focus on the Swedish sugar-cane project2. Over a period of five years 
(2012-2016), I visited the area where the project was to be implemented, 
northwest of Bagamoyo town, at least once per year. My aim was to talk to 
people living on the land to understand their views on the project plans and 
follow the implementation process to observe ongoing developments. As 
indicated in the prologue, over this period of time, I also interviewed various 
other people involved in the project, including company representatives and 
state officials working close to the President. In total, this study is based on 
79 interviews – 39 interviews with people living on and around the land 
planned for investment, and 40 interviews with Tanzanian state officials at 
District level, at State Agencies, Ministries, President’s Office and within 
key agricultural programs. In addition, I read and analyzed 45 documents 
including policies, strategies, statements, media articles, and reports. 
 
                                                            
2 The second investment, Felisa Ltd in Kigoma Region, received its land rights in 2007, but 
is at the time of writing not yet fully operational, producing annual food crops on 
approximately 100 hectares out of the 4,258 hectares they lease, while parts of the unused 
land within the project is leased to smallholder farmers on a seasonal basis. The decision to 







Importantly, while the research presented is based on an ample selection of 
project documents and strengthened by the opportunity to follow the 
Bagamoyo project over many years, it does not claim to tell the whole story 
about this development project. Nor does it claim to provide an exhaustive 
account of why it, or many other investments in many African countries, 
have failed. However, the findings still contribute to a general discussion 
about why so few of the planned large-scale agricultural investments since 
the early 2000’s have delivered proposed outcomes. 
 
Bagamoyo town (see Figure 1), with its decaying, whitewashed stone 
buildings and its vibrant harbor overlooking the turquoise waters of the 
Indian Ocean, acts as the center of Bagamoyo district. Situated 65 km north 
of Dar es Salaam, it used to be the headquarters of the German colonial 
regime, before they moved it to Dar es Salaam. While the interest in 
Bagamoyo declined after this move, it was re-ignited under the rule of 
President Kikwete (2005-2015), who was eager to “deliver” to his home 
district before stepping down as President in 2015. The Swedish sugar-cane 
investment, situated north-west of town, was one of his “deliveries”. 
                                                            
3 A more elaborate version of the background of SEKAB and the project’s trajectory 
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Figure 1. The sugar-cane project site north-west of Bagamoyo town, 
Pwani Region, Tanzania. 
 
Razaba Ranch, its people and their land rights 
In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the 
government and the Swedish investor. In May 2013 the investor acquired 





Razaba Ranch (Ranchi ya Zanzibar Bagamoyo), a former cattle ranch4 (see 
Figure 1). The ranch includes another approximately 6,000 hectares to the 
east, along the coast. Expected outputs of the project included production 
of 130,000 tons sugar and 10 million liters ethanol annually, employment of 
2,000 people and 10,000–12,000 jobs as spin-off effects, 13–18 million USD 
in annual revenue for outgrower farmers, communities managing 3,000–
4,000 hectares of modern irrigated farms “with greatly improved standard 
of living” and 1,374 people resettled but amply compensated5. The initial 
time line as per 2007 was that about 3,000 hectares of plantation would be 
developed in 2008, and the remaining plantation would be developed in 2009 
and ready for ethanol production in 2010. However, contrary to the huge 
expectations on what the project would achieve, the project became 
entangled in a messy reality, struggling to become operational over a decade. 
 
The area has been inhabited for at least 1,500 years. The local communities 
affected by the investment include the smallholder farmers and pastoralists6 
living on, or using, the land acquired by the investor, and the villages 
bordering the project site. However, these two groups of people were 
involved, and impacted, in very different ways.  
 
                                                            
4 The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar used the land as a cattle ranch from 1974 
until 1994, when the project was abandoned. The approximately 300 workers and their 
families were permitted to live on the land until the farm was re-purposed for other 
activities. 
5 See Table 1 in Paper III for a detailed description of expected and achieved 
outcomes. 
6 Smallholder farmers on Razaba Ranch grow many of the major Tanzanian subsistence 
crops, including maize, paddy rice and cassava. Moreover, many households grow perennial 
fruit trees and cash crops, for instance banana, avocado, mango, watermelon, sesame and 
cashew nuts. Only a few households grow sugarcane, and then mainly for domestic 
consumption. In addition to smallholder farmers and Barabaigs, other groups residing in 
the project area include charcoal producers and seasonal fishermen. Villagers from adjacent 
villages were found to use the land for temporary cultivation, firewood collection, hunting 
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There are five sub-villages in the project area, with a large number of 
scattered houses and huts in between. The population in the project area has 
been estimated to approximately 1,400 people, representing a wide range of 
tribes including the original peoples of the Swahili coast, such as Zigua, agro-
pastoralists such as Sukuma, and pastoralists such as the Barabaig.  
 
None of the people living inside the project site have had their land rights 
formally acknowledged and were frequently referred to as “invaders” or 
“settlers” by company representatives, state officials and development staff. 
While project proponents represented the land as unambiguously general 
land under the management of the state, there were a range of contradicting 
stories told by the residents on the land. For example, some residents 
insisted that they were not adequately compensated at the time when the 
land was granted to Zanzibar and questioned the allocation of the land in 
the 1970s. Other residents claimed they had never been part of Razaba 
Ranch and therefore should not be included in any resettlement scheme 
targeting the ranch. Yet others advanced their customary rights of 
occupancy in accordance with the land law7 allowing people who have being 
using or occupying the land for 12 consecutive years to claim formal land 
rights. However, their claims were not recognized. 
 
Evaluation and resettlement 
In order to finance the 500 million USD investment, the company sought a 
loan from a consortium of Development Banks, led by the African 
Development Bank. In turn, Sida was asked to provide a guarantee8 for that 
loan. One condition from the funders was that the project adhered to 
                                                            
7 Part IV of the Village Land Act. 
8 Sida’s guarantee instrument aims to reduce risk for the private investor. The (loan) 
guarantee means that Sida, and ultimately the Swedish state, pays the lender (usually a 
bank) if the borrowing investor fails to make their payment. It was introduced for testing in 





International Finance Corporation Performance Standard number 5 for 
Involuntary Resettlement. These standards rest on principles of minimizing 
adverse social and economic impacts, including providing compensation for 
loss of assets. 
 
A comprehensive Resettlement Action Plan was produced, where a total of 
1,374 people within the site were identified as project-affected people and 
thus legible for compensation when resettled. As a basis for compensation, 
an evaluation of each household’s assets was performed in October 2010. 
The company encouraged farmers to shift from farming perennial crops to 
annual crops, in order to avoid investing in assets they would not be 
compensated for at resettlement. 
 
The outgrower programme 
While people living on the project site were mainly involved in the project 
through the resettlement process, the estimated 6,000 villagers9 living 
adjacent to the project site were involved in other ways. The main project 
activities in these villages were related to the planned outgrower programme 
where the company envisioned to engage 2,000—3,000 smallholder farmers 
to produce sugar-cane for their factory. 
The idea with the programme was that farmers would organize themselves 
in groups around plots of 100 hectares, to make it possible to set up 
irrigation systems. In total, the company expected to develop 5,000—6,000 
hectares under such management10. The company envisioned transforming 
smallholders into entrepreneurs, increasing their incomes and reducing their 
                                                            
9 Living in three villages and four sub-villages bordering the site; the population 
figure is from 2008. 
10 According to the company’s project plan for developing the outgrower programme 
from 2010, a six-year time period was anticipated in 2011, and it was stated that the 
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food insecurity. Thus, the program was essential for the company’s stated 
aim to achieve poverty reduction and constituted one of the main reasons 
for Sida to support the project. The farmers were expected to take loans of 
1.25 million USD. It was difficult to get clarity about why they needed to 
take such large loans, but one component was setting up irrigation systems. 
This was a figure that I found, through interviews, that the farmers had 
difficulties to understand the magnitude of11.  If the farmers could not repay 
these loans, they risked losing their land, a risk that was identified by Sida in 
the Final Appraisal12.   
Sida’s financial support 
The Swedish company applied twice for financial support from Sida. On the 
first occasion, on 29 October 2009, their application was rejected, most 
likely due to criticism in media and elsewhere, but partly with reference to 
an assessment I had performed on behalf of the Sida Helpdesk for 
Environment and Climate Change. In the assessment I had identified 
controversial changes made in the Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment for the Bagamoyo project, systematically downplaying the 
potential negative impacts by the project on environment and people13. 
Around this time, the company lost its support from three Swedish 
municipalities, shifted names from SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania Ltd to 
Bagamoyo Eco Energy Ltd, and shifted its focus from ethanol to sugar as 
                                                            
11 In fact, I discovered that the interpreter used a lower sum when translating to the 
villagers, citing the reason that it was impossible for them to comprehend the concept of 
billions of Tanzanian shillings. 
12 See summary of Paper III 






the main product14. This fitted well into Tanzanian policy with sugar being 
one of three target crops and high sugar import costs. Only a few months 
after the setup of the new company, a new timeline was presented, according 
to which sugar production would be initiated in June 2013, three years later 
than initially planned. 
In May 2012, Sida received yet another application, for a 94 million USD 
credit enhancement guarantee (equivalent to 940 million SEK), which, if 
affected, would have been Sida’s largest such guarantee ever. In Feb 2014, 
Sida decided to support the company with a smaller grant of 16 million USD 
from the Swedish Development Budget, to be used as a security for a South 
African bank loan for a bridging phase to the larger loan of 300 million USD. 
While the project was run by a “new” company, the company executives 
remained the same. Moreover, the project targeted the same land, with the 
same crop. The same people were targeted by resettlement and outgrower 
schemes, and the project was based on the same environmental certificate. 
However, the company’s ambitious plans in Rufiji District, which had 
attracted the most substantial criticism in 2009, had been downplayed, albeit 
not removed. Another difference was that the project was marketed as a 
food project, rather than a (more controversial) biofuel project. After 
having paid 54 million SEK (6.2 million USD) during 2014, Sida set a 
number of conditions before providing the next payment. However, these 
were not fulfilled and in May 2015, Sida decided to stop any further 
payments. The application for the larger guarantee was still pending when, 
on 15 March 2016, nearly ten years after the Memorandum of 
                                                            
14 For more information about the emerging biofuel market in Sweden, the role of 
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Understanding had been signed, the newly elected President Magufuli 
decided to revoke the company’s Right of Occupancy15. 
While we might imagine that this would be the end of “the Bagamoyo 
Saga”16, it was not. On 11 September 2017, the company launched a lawsuit 
against the Tanzanian state, at the International Center for the Settlement 
of International Disputes — a World Bank organ in Washington DC. The 
aim is to regain an alleged loss of 52 million USD. According to the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, this lawsuit constitutes 
the first known investor-state dispute linked to the new wave of large-scale 
agro-investment. Thus, the “Bagamoyo Saga” continues (see Epilogue). 
My thesis was a compilation thesis and based on three peer-reviewed 
publications and one manuscript. Below is a brief summary of each paper. 
 
Summary of Paper I: 
 
“A critical analysis of practices and dynamics of large-scale land acquisitions 
in Tanzania” (published with Jumanne Abdallah, Kjell Havnevik, and Lennart 
Salomonsson in ”The Global Land Grab: Beyond the Hype” edited by Zoomers 
& Kaag 2014) 
 
                                                            
15 In October 2016, the President granted 10,000 ha of land in Bagamoyo to the domestic 
company Bakhresa. One month later, the company received a letter from the newly elected 
president stating that the Government no longer “have an interest” in the project, a 
decision that became public in February 2017. According to national media, Bakhresa re-
initiated activities on the seed cane farm in December 2017. 
16 To the horde of increasingly critical spectators, the story of the Swedish sugar-cane 
investment has become known as ‘the Bagamoyo Saga’, a name coined by Ann Usher, 
journalist at Development Today, who has been following this project since it was made 





Paper I formed the basis of the thesis: It paints a broader picture of the status 
of large-scale agro-investments in Tanzania, showing that the recent hype 
on massive “land grabbing”, and the criticism of it, was exaggerated and 
poorly grounded. Based on statistics from the Tanzanian state and a review 
of reports from Non-Governmental Organisations and scientific papers, I 
identified more than 30 planned deals larger than 2,000 hectares in Tanzania 
initiated since 2003. However, a short pilot study in 2012 revealed a striking 
gap between the extent of planned deals and the number of materialized 
investments – most had never left the stage of being a paper product. Some 
had already gone bankrupt. Moreover, a majority of the few investors who 
did require land were struggling to start operations. Another important 
finding was that the rush for large-scale biofuel investment had ceased 
completely – all biofuel investments had gone bankrupt, left their sites or 
attempted to shift to food production, but were still struggling to 
materialize. 
 
Summary of Paper II:  
 
“Land deals in limbo: Exploring simplification, delay and development 
failure in a large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania” (will be published as a 
book chapter in “Land, Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Africa’s 
Pastoral Drylands, edited by Jeremy Lind, Doris Okenwa and Ian Scoones in 
June 2020) 
 
Paper II was one of the key papers for communicating my findings. In brief, 
this paper showed that plans for how and when the project would develop 
disregarded a lot of the complexity in the local context – the plans built on 
many simplified ways of seeing the context. I show that this disregard of 
contextual complexity in the design of the Bagamoyo project contributed to 
repeated delays in the project implementation process, since a lot of 
obstacles appeard that had not been planned for. In the end, these delays 
contributed to the project’s failure to materialize at all. While these delays 
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supposed main beneficiaries of development cooperation: the poor people 
living on, and around, the project site. In order to visualize the negative 
impacts on the local smallholders and pastoralists that are so central to this 
brief, I will describe some of the contextual complexities in detail. 
 
One of the most important issues that were underestimated in project 
timelines was the complex situation of land use and land rights, and the 
associated competing claims over land that is common all over Tanzania, just 
like in many other African countries. In Tanzania, all land is owned by the 
state, since Germany and Britain introduced systems of Crown land. The 
current land legislation also recognizes customary rights to land, where 
demarcated villages have the right to manage their so called village land. 
However, there are loopholes and ambiguities in the land laws. For instance, 
land under state management, so called general land, is identified as 
including unused village land. This makes rights to land a matter of 
interpretation, based on perceptions of what unused is. In such conflicts, 
pastoralists and smallholders, especially women, have repeatedly been 
shown to be the most vulnerable to losing their land. This was the case also 
in Bagamoyo: villagers living around Razaba Ranch dismissed the existence 
of unused land, referring to activities such as grazing, the collection of non-
timber forest products or set-asides for future generations. Moreover, some 
of the people living on the land planned for investment advanced their 
customary rights in line with land laws allowing people who have being using 
or occupying the land for 12 consecutive years to claim formal land rights. 
Nevertheless, they were not recognized with such rights17. 
 
One of the most important land conflicts in the Bagamoyo case, was a court 
case initiated by three elders living on the project site. Referring, truthfully 
or not, to their historical use of the land, they decided to sue the company 
and the Tanzanian state for trespassing. Even though the court case was sped 
                                                            





up by the government, and won by the company and the Tanzanian state, it 
delayed the investment with at least three years. 
 
A second important disregard was that there was no thorough soil analysis 
conducted at an early stage of project planning, which caused a number of 
delays. Even though knowledge about soil properties would obviously be a 
prerequisite to guarantee a feasible project, the company did not properly 
investigate soil properties on the estate in the early planning phase. Instead, 
soil properties were investigated in detail for the first time many years after 
the agreement with the Government was sealed, with surprising findings: 
 
“Then when you start to do all of this soil investigation I talked about– it showed 
that OK the land is not all that good, they said you can't grow crops on all the types 
of land anywhere, so when they did the soil study you found that you had salinity 
and other problems, so– we have a mosaic of land that is good to use, a lot of land 
is not really good for farming at all”. (personal interview with Managing Director, 
April 2014). 
This late discovery of lack of fertile land launched a cascade of downstream 
effects, which were also largely related to land. For instance, the company 
approached nearby villages in search for land, which revealed ongoing 
conflicts over land between these villages that needed to be solved first. In 
negotiations between the company and the villages, there were 
misunderstandings and conflicts on who would compensate the villages if 
they decided to contribute land to the project, and with how much. In 
parallel, 3,000 hectares of land in the northern part of the project site, one 
of the most fertile land areas on the site, became subject to a conflict within 
the government on whether it belonged to the adjacent Saadani National 
Park or the Ranch. In 2015, the area was claimed by the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, who insisted that the land belonged to the 
bordering Saadani National Park. All these processes delayed the project 
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other development banks, demanded that the company had access to a 
certain minimum area of arable land.  
 
Indeed, the fading interest among smallholders and funders was stated a key 
reason for Sida to provide a guarantee for a smaller loan, to keep the project 
going until the larger loan had been sorted out. The importance of not 
producing simplified project plans unaware of context is pointed out as a 
key policy message below. This becomes even more pertinent given the 
negative impacts that delay had on local communities.  
 
While all these processes took place, the people living on, and using, the land 
planned for investment were waiting in uncertainty. Despite conditions to 
adhere to the sustainability standards, resting on principles of free, prior, 
informed consent throughout the research, I met much confusion among 
people living on and around Razaba Ranch about what the project actually 
entailed, who was responsible for what, where they were being resettled and 
when. Similar findings have been presented by other studies of the same 
case. The lack of information, mixed messages on resettlement and ongoing 
land conflicts created mental ill-health, tension and conflict. Guards were 
hired by the company, with repeated reports of violent behaviour towards 
people cutting down trees to make charcoal, an important source of income 
for some people. Every three to six months, they were informed by company 
consultants or state officials that a resettlement was approaching. Since the 
evaluation, they had been encouraged to stop investing in perennial crops, 
and in their houses and other assets, since they would not be compensated 
for these investments. This was problematic, since perennial crops are often 
a fallback if annual crops are flooded. Some farmers were forced to stop 
farming and take jobs at minimum wage for the company. For financial and 
other reasons, some male farmers sent their wives and children away to 
relatives. Others kept investment to a minimum. Since the people were to 







The consultant hired by the company to design the Resettlement Action 
Plan proved very important for the smallholders: through the consultant and 
her team, smallholders were regularly informed about the company’s plans. 
Moreover, the consultant initiated various activities with the aim of 
diversifying the farmer’s livelihoods and skills: they were assisted to set up 
chicken farms and invited to courses on construction or acquiring a driver’s 
license. Moreover, some farmers were trained to set up and organize 
themselves around irrigated outgrower schemes with rice as a trial crop.  
 
To conclude, the paper particularly points to delay being important if we 
want to understand why the Bagamoyo project failed. Perhaps even more 
importantly from a poverty perspective, it shows that delay can have severe 
effects on local communities. 
In this paper, I could also show how similar simplifications have been 
observed and criticized in many past studies of development projects. Thus, 
an important conclusion was that simplification of different aspects of 
people and environment is being repeated over time and over geographical 
contexts.  
 
Based on this conclusion, I wanted to understand more about how and why 
project proponents could keep repeating such simplifications, even though 
past experience and research, as well as the perspectives of, and impacts on, 
people living on the land, showed that these simplifications can be very 
problematic. This was investigated in paper III. 
 
Summary of Paper III: 
 
 “Conjuring a win-world: Resilient development narratives in a large-scale 
agro-investment in Tanzania” (published with Flora Hajdu in the Journal of 
Development Studies, 2018) 
 
Paper III is the second key paper in terms of presenting my findings. In this 
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very valuable to take into account in the Bagamoyo project, and which could 
have helped planners foresee potential obstacles, local context and 
perspectives, past experiences and research on development18. Through a 
thorough reading of previous studies of development projects, we found 
that these three sources of information have often been overlooked in 
development projects. This literature also shows how projects which are 
designed without taking these sources of information seriously, have been 
shown over and over again not to bring expected results. Despite this, the 
design of broader development agendas and project planning continue to 
overlook context. The Bagamoyo project was just another example.  
These three elements of context are all important for various reasons: past 
experiences are important to integrate when launching “new” development 
agendas and projects, in order to avoid previous mistakes and learn from 
successes. In this paper, we outline that this is the fourth time since German 
colonial time that the idea of large-scale agro-investment as a way to achieve 
rural development and poverty alleviation is launched in Tanzania. Much 
development research and practical experiences are available, which have 
shown that many past attempts have not materialized as expected. One of 
the main problems behind the notorious British Ground Nut Scheme in the 
1940s, for instance, was gross simplifications in its design, focusing on 
technical aspects while ignoring local variation in soil quality and rainfall. 
 
Our analysis showed that many proponents of the project had limited 
understanding of the local context, and the perspectives and everyday life of 
local people. Officers at African Development Bank and Sida, and company 
representatives spent very little time on the land planned for investment, 
with the aim of understanding people’s experiences, needs and perspectives. 
Instead, the way project proponents talked about land and rural 
smallholders built on certain, simplified ways of understanding the local 
context that have been counter-proven many times.  Two such 
                                                            
18 ”Research on development” is a simplifying term for Development Studies, Post-





simplifications of the local context proved crucial. First, the perspective that 
there is an abundance of unused land available for investment, without any 
negative consequences for smallholder farmers, is a highly problematic, 
stubborn myth that has been counter-proven many times in development 
studies and through experience. Importantly, Sida wrote in their final 
appraisal that “there is no such thing as unused land”, suggesting that the 
availability of land should be assessed later (for the larger credit guarantee, 
which was never operationalized). 
 
Second, we found that the view of smallholders was simplified in the sense 
that project proponents tended to describe smallholders as a homogenous 
group. While this is a problem in itself, since smallholders differ widely in 
their knowledge, perspectives and needs, smallholders were also often 
described in a negative way, as if they were lagging behind, using ancient 
methods, were inefficient and did not understand their own best interests. 
This way of describing smallholders as “backward” has clear colonial 
legacies. Especially strong were these perceptions among company 
representatives. In a discussion with a company consultant he for example 
explained the company’s “model” on how to help the smallholders become 
a “business man” through helping farmers in the planned outgrower villages 
to “rise up” from the “black hole” where they currently lived and from where 
“you cannot see straight”. He added: 
 
“You can look up and you might see an object moving, and we know it’s an 
airplane, but if you were just in that hole you wouldn’t know it’s an airplane, you 
would just see pshht! You know what I mean? Cause you can’t fill in the gaps 
(personal interview, 10 April 2014). 
We argued in the paper that these statements build on rather extreme 
assumptions of smallholders as a homogenous, inferior group. Such 
assumptions have been counter-proven many times, in development 
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various ways of claiming their rights, such as when three elders managed to 
influence project implementation through filing a lawsuit.  
 
The company representatives’ relatively extreme images of the smallholder, 
combined with their lack of experience in Africa, was especially problematic 
since the company developed project design, including the outgrower 
program. The company also had an important role when it came to updating 
Sida and other actors on how the project was progressing on the ground, 
and the views of the farmers on this progress. This was problematic, since, 
consistently, in our interviews, company representatives and smallholders 
on the ground gave us very different information: while the company 
wanted to provide a picture of progress and agreement, smallholders 
described a much more complex reality with challenges and stalled 
processes. Moreover, they were increasingly worried about how, when and 
where they would be resettled, and how they would be compensated.  
 
Another key finding presented in Paper III, relevant to the policy messages 
below, is how project funders dealt with serious risks for smallholders. Many 
farmers included in the outgrower program were positive and hopeful about 
the project. However, we could also show that many farmers had problems 
with fully understanding the program and the risks it entailed. For instance, 
Sida identified serious risks of smallholders taking part in the outgrower 
program; they could lose access to land, and/or they could become seriously 
indebted. These serious risks were “accepted” in the final appraisal, with two 
mitigation measures: i) clear instructions to the company that these risks 
must not materialize since “a sound outgrower approach is key to Sida’s 
support” and ii) close monitoring by Sida (with external support) to ensure 
that these risks were “managed in an adequate manner”. Both these 
mitigation measures are problematic. For instance, while Sida relied heavily 
on the company to make sure that farmers did not lose land or became 
indebted, the company would not be able to control all events that could 
have impact on farmers e.g. how involved banks would act.  Relying this 





for the supposed beneficiaries of development collaboration proved 
problematic. The second mitigation measure, close monitoring, was never 
initiated since it, from Sida’s perspective, appeared as if “nothing happened”. 
Again, delays became a problem for the smallholders, since they already 
experienced negative outcomes even though the project had not 
materialized. This will be pointed out as a key policy message below. 
 
In summary, Paper III showed that another contributing reason to why 
many large-scale agro-investments fail to materialize could be that their 
design repeatedly overlooks important sources of information. In turn, this 
means that project proponents lack important knowledge about the local 
context and that poor people’s perspectives are far from being the take-off 
point.  
 
Summary of Paper IV:  
 
“Between dependence and deprivation: The interlocking nature of land 
alienation in Tanzania” (published in Journal of Agrarian Studies, 2018, with 
J. Bluwstein, J.F. Lund, K. Askew, H. Stein, C. Noe, R. Odgaard and F. 
Maganga) 
 
Paper IV serves the purpose of placing my research findings in a wider 
context, by looking at the combined pressure on land in Tanzania; for large-
scale agriculture, mining, tourism and conservation. Most of all, it clearly 
shows that one of the simplifications above, the one about accessible land or 
unused land, is not reflecting the reality. Instead, the paper shows that 
pressure on land in Tanzania can be seen as a major threat to poverty 
reduction efforts.  
 
Such an aggregated analysis of the current pressure on land in Tanzania is 
important, since smallholder farmers and pastoralists suffer from 
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The overall message is that while smallholders are still largely dependent on 
land-based livelihoods, they frequently lose land for the purposes mentioned 
above and are offered a limited number of alternatives. For instance, we 
could conclude that the share of reserved land for national parks and wildlife 
management in Tanzania will soon reach a stunning 50 percent of Tanzania’s 
land.  
 
Paper IV also shows that landlessness is a growing issue in some regions, 
particularly among women. It shows that there are no vast tracts of unused, 
available land for expropriation, as stated, for instance, by many actors 
supporting the agenda on large-scale agro-investment. An important 
conclusion is that all these constraints placed on smallholder farmers deprive 
them of the opportunity to increase production. This is problematic since, 
as described above, low yields in “inefficient smallholder farming” is often 
used as a way to motivate the need for development strategies such as large-
scale agro-investment. 
 
Thus, apart from situating the thesis’ findings in a wider context, Paper IV 
provides solid evidence for the claim that the idea of large-scale agricultural 
investment is underpinned by serious simplifications in relation to land 
abundance. Finally, Paper IV includes some findings from my second case 
study in Kigoma, which support the conclusion in the thesis that stalled 
investments can have widespread impacts, since the Kigoma investment has 
also been repeatedly delayed, but nevertheless has had severe impacts on 
local communities.  
 
Overall, the thesis points to the importance for policy makers and private 
actors to understand the context, and take it seriously, when designing and 
implementing a development project. This might be even more important 





Context is to be understood in a wide sense: the thesis points to three 
important aspects of such contextual knowledge: 
 
1) Knowledge about past experience from similar projects and 
development trends 
Such knowledge can be obtained from various sources: local communities, 
other development practitioners, evaluations or social and natural science 
research literature. 
 
2) Knowledge about the current socio-political context and challenges 
that might arise 
This means that project design must take into account, for instance, social 
and political relations and inequalities; vested interests among involved 
actors; conflicting claims and power struggles over land; environmental 
complexity and unexpected external events at national or global level. As 
shown above, many of these contextual complexities contributed to 
repeated delays and were very challenging for the Bagamoyo project. 
 
Given the emphasis on gender mainstreaming in development cooperation, 
knowing the context concerning land access is especially important. There 
are at least two reasons for this: landlessness is a growing issue in some 
regions, particularly among women and women have also been shown to be 
disproportionally marginalized in land conflicts. Moreover, smallholder 
farmers being pushed off their land due to investment have difficulties 
finding alternative livelihoods. Thus, the current pressure on land in 
Tanzania can be seen as a major threat to poverty reduction efforts.  
 
3) Knowledge about the needs of people living in poverty, their interests 
and conditions, and their perspectives on development, as a take-off 
point 
 
While poor people’s perspectives is an important part of the socio-political 
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reflects key recommendations in global and Swedish policy. For instance, 
the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguards require an 
engagement process with affected people19. Interestingly, this is mentioned 
as a particularly important requirement in order to “reduce the risk of 
project-related delay”. For Swedish Development Cooperation, the Politics 
of Global Development from 2003 states that “all decisions and activities 
must be underlined by [among others] the perspective of the poor”, and that 
”poor people’s needs, interests, capacity and conditions should be a point of 
departure in efforts to achieve equitable and sustainable development” (p. 
19, my emphasis)20. Thus, while policy is very clear on the importance of 
poor people’s perspectives as the foundation of any development project, 
my thesis problematizes how development cooperation actually integrates 
poor people’s perspectives in practice. Importantly, people living in poverty 
are not a homogenous group, but represent a range of perspectives, needs, 
vested interests and social inequalities. 
 
Implicit is the importance to critically reflect upon, and adjust, one’s own 
knowledge base and perspectives on development, and take local, every-day 
perspectives on development as the entry point for projects to truly adapt 
to the needs of people living in poverty.  
                                                            
19 In the Environment and Social Standard 6 on Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African 
Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities, it is a general requirement that 
the borrower “undertake[s] an engagement process with affected Indigenous Peoples/Sub-
Saharan underserved traditional local communities”. The Standard also states that “this 
engagement process will include stakeholder analysis and engagement planning, disclosure 
of information, and meaningful consultation, in a culturally appropriate and gender and 
inter-generationally inclusive manner”.  (p. 79) 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/837721522762050108/Environmental-and-Social-
Framework.pdf Accessed 27 Nov 2019 
20 Similarly, the Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Assistance (2016), states: “Sweden’s development cooperation takes as 






To take poor people’s perspectives into account proved to become even 
more challenging in the Bagamoyo project, when Sida entered into a 
collaboration with a Swedish private actor with no previous experience of 
African countries. As I have shown, company representatives held strong 
positions in supplying other actors with information on project progress. At 
the same time, I showed that this information was often misleading, and 
influenced by their colonial view of the life and capacity of local people. This 
shows the importance for developing cooperation practitioners to gather 
independent information to enable independent assessment in 
collaborations with private sector. This would require enquiry into past 
experience and research, as noted above, combined with independent and 
frequent field visits to build trust with people and assess the situation from 
their perspective.  
 
For all the recommendations above, an overarching prerequisite is that 
structures are in place that allow for, and incentivize, in-depth analyses 
including field visits for development cooperation practitioners. In my 
research, independent field-visits seemed under-prioritized.  
 
While many of the above policy messages have been put forward before, the 
insight from my thesis about paying attention to delay has been little 
discussed in development policy debates. I have shown that if context is 
simplified in project design and implementation, the project can become 
repeatedly delayed. Importantly, delays can have severe and negative impacts 
on all actors, including local communities. Thus, I argue that delays, or the 
failure of development projects to materialize at all, are important but 
overlooked in international development cooperation.  
 
In this particular project, there were several ways through which the impacts 
of delay became invisible. One was that the monitoring of socio-economic 
impacts of the project, a mitigation measure to safeguard smallholders from 
losing land and becoming indebted in Sida’s risk assessment, was never 
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problematic, as it renders stalled projects, and their substantial effects, 
invisible. Second, the availability of land for the investment that Sida wanted 
to assess never happened, since the project didn’t materialize. Against this 
background, I put forward the following recommendations: 
 
Risks for delays and failure need to be taken very seriously: First, in 
situations where there is risk for delays, this should be noted in Appraisals, 
Risk Assessments and other Due Diligence reports of development projects. 
Second, such risks must be taken seriously. Existing Sustainability Standards 
and Safeguards do not address risks of delay in any elaborate manner. In the 
World Bank Safeguards, for instance, the reference above about engaging 
indigenous people as a way to reduce the risk of project delay, is the only 
time delay is mentioned. There are no other requirements as to how delay 
can be hindered (such as understanding the context in a wider sense), or 
requirements on how to handle project delays21. In Sida’s decision to provide 
the guarantee in 2014, risks for delay were deemed high, but only mentioned 
in relation to risks for rising project costs, risks for speculation in land or 
risks for the company not being able to pay back the loan. Thus, we can draw 
the important conclusion that the risks of negative impacts of delay on local 
communities were not addressed in any of these documents.  
 
Against this background, I recommend that in processes where Swedish or 
Global Sustainability Safeguards and Standards are developed or revised, 
more emphasis be put on delay, reflecting one or more of the following 
elements: 
 
                                                            
21 In the International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 1, “Assessment 
and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts”, delay is not 
mentioned at all. https://www.ifc.org/ In the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security, delay is mentioned once, in the context that “those who give 
up their tenure rights to land, fisheries and forests should receive equivalent 





• Knowing the context (in a wider sense, see above) is important to 
reduce risk for delay 
• Potential impacts of delay on people living in poverty must be 
analyzed and mitigated 
• In cases of delay, monitoring and follow up of the situation among 
local communities is still necessary 
• Where risks of delay are assessed high, costs for mitigating delay and 
managing its effects should be included in project budgets 
Finally, this thesis relates to the debate on large- versus small-scale 
agriculture. As mentioned in the Background section, a large share of 
planned large-scale agro-investments have stalled or failed to materialize, 
not only in Tanzania, but in many other African countries. Even though 
little attention has so far been paid to the impacts of stalled or failed 
investments in research, local communities around other investments are 
probably being negatively impacted by such failures just like in the 
Bagamoyo project. Given the complex nature of such investments and their 
implicit vast need for land in an often land-scarce context, they have 
repeatedly been documented to encounter massive protests and resistance 
from local communities. Moreover, delayed large-scale agro-investments 
supposedly bring huge transaction costs to both development bodies and 
governments. Few investments have been found to create jobs for local 
communities other than low-paid, seasonal positions. A final drawback with 
large-scale agriculture worth mentioning is that it goes against 
recommendations for climate change adaptation, where it is recommended 
to increase variability and diversity of crops to spread risks over time and 
space, in a context of an increasingly unpredictable weather. Against this 
background, and with repeated reference to poor people’s perspectives, I put 
forward the recommendation that development cooperation prioritizes 
support directly to smallholders, based on their own expressed and context-
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As indicated above, the Bagamoyo Saga partly continues across the Atlantic, 
13 000 kilometers west of Razaba Ranch, in Washington DC. Through 
dialogue with researchers at the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment22 and the International Institute for Sustainable Development, I 
have followed the investor-state proceedings taking place at the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, one of the five 
institutions making up the World Bank Group. This section is informed by 
their insights. 
  
I have chosen to highlight three aspects about such international investment 
disputes that are particularly relevant to development cooperation. First, 
these investor-state claims suffer from very limited transparency which 
makes it difficult to know who is involved, whether and how people 
impacted by the investment may be affected and what the outcomes are. 
While efforts have been made in past years to increase transparency around 
                                                            
22 The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) is an applied research 
center in New York, working to align frameworks that govern international 
investment with sustainable development and human rights objectives, with actors 
engaged in reform of the international investment regime. For more information: 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/. The International Institute for Sustainable Investment is a 
Canadian think-tank that provides advice to governments to help transform public 







investor-state disputes23 significant challenges remain. This detracts from 
efforts by development cooperation to strive for increased transparency in 
international governance and policy frameworks. 
 
A second problem is that treaties and claims based upon these are generally 
geared towards protecting the interests of the private sector, while shifting 
high amounts of risk onto the host-country and its taxpayers24. As of July 
2019 investors had obtained a favorable decision in at least 51,5 percent of 
publicly-known claims, mainly in disputes against low- and middle-income 
countries25. However, both awards and settlements can consume significant 
portions of states’ annual budgets since the average cost of tribunal 
proceedings alone is 5 million USD26. Importantly, when respondent states 
lose and pay large awards27 they often use public expenditures. Thus, should 
the Government of Tanzania lose in the Bagamoyo claim, they may lose 52 
million USD (520 million SEK) from public expenditures. This equates to 
approximately two thirds of the yearly Swedish development support to 
Tanzania (750-850 million SEK). 
 
                                                            
23 For example through the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the UN 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. 
24 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator  
25 CCSI, “Primer: International Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement” http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/06/03/primer-international-investment-
treaties-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement/, citing Behn & Daza, “The Defense 
Burden in International Investment Arbitration” (2019) PluriCourts Working Paper 
(forthcoming). 
26 Ibid. See also Hodgson, ‘Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Case for 
Reform’ in Kalicki & Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century  (Brill 2014) 756.  
27 The average award is 120 to 500 million USD (ibid and  UNCTAD “Investor-State 
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The third problematic aspect of the international investment apparatus I 
want to highlight is also related to investor protection: in these disputes, the 
investors’ claims often supersede states’ obligations to protect human rights 
and environment28. For instance, investor compliance with national law on 
environmental and social impacts or international sustainability standards 
are generally not considered in tribunal procedures. Moreover, 
environmental degradation or complaints from local communities because 
of the investment are not adequately considered in these processes, if at all. 
Indeed, local communities cannot intervene as third parties in these 
disputes29. This means that international investment treaties can provide 
companies with a remedy and even shield them from accountability to these 
people30, even when not taking sustainability issues seriously as companies 
can recover expenditures regardless of the social and environmental impacts 
of their investments. 
  
One overall conclusion that can be drawn from the thesis, combined with 
these insights about the international investment regime, is that the major 
risk in resource extraction projects is not taken by the investor. Rather, 
smallholder farmers, pastoralists and the public at large stand to lose in many 
different ways.  
 
Although there is increasing recognition of the high societal costs associated 
with these procedures31 it remains uncertain whether current discussions 
                                                            
28 For instance Coleman et al 2019 “Human Rights Law and the Investment Treaty 
Regime” (CCSI Working Paper, June 2019) 
29 For more information, see CCSI, Access to Justice 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/access-to-justice/ 
30 See e.g., Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of 
Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23. 
31 Pohl, J. “Societal benefits and costs of International Investment Agreements: A 






will be sufficient to solve the serious and systemic issues with investor 
protection and investor-state disputes32. A final recommendation is 
therefore that development cooperation supports reform of the 
international investment regime to align treaties and dispute settlement 
systems with protection of smallholder farmers, pastoralists, the 
environment and the general public in developing countries.  
 
Moreover, contracts between private and public actors supported by 
development cooperation should be assessed along similar lines, since such 
documents and procedures can play a vital role in ensuring sustainable 
investment and possibilities for poverty reduction in global extractive 




                                                            
32 Sachs 2019 “ISDS Reform at UNCITRAL: Two Guiding Principles.” CCSI Blog (16 
Oct. 2019)  
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